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El prop6sito de este ensayo es examinar las causas basicas de la inflaci6n 
mexicana en los 70 y asi formar una idea de las causas por la aceleraci6n 
de la inflaci6n en los 80. A pesar de que algunos factores estructurales 
fueron la causa de parte de la presi6n durante este periodo, este estudio 
revela que casi todos los aumentos de los precios se deben a factores 
monetarios. 
Introduction 
After many years of price stability, Mexico's inflation began to 
accelerate in the 1970s, increasing at an average annual rate of 12.08 
percent during the 1970-75 period to 21.22 percent per annum dur-
ing 1975-80, and finally accelerating to an average annual rate of 
60.68 percent between 1980 and 1985. Clearly, the country's cur-
rent bout of inflation has many of its origins in developments that 
occurred in the 1970s. 
The main purpose of the analysis below is to examine the 
specific underlying causes of Mexican inflation in the 1970s and its 
general determinants over the 1950-79 period. Hopefully, this anal-
ysis will provide some insights into the inflationary process cur-
rently taking place in Mexico and the policy measures most likely 
to be effective in controlling the overall increase in domestic prices. 
The overall conclusion of the study is that while structural fac-
tors were undoubtedly responsible for some of the inflationary pres-
sures during this period, nearly all of tqe increase in prices can be 
accounted for by monetary factors. 
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External Links 
There is a widespread view both within and outside of Mexico 
that the country's acceleration of inflation beginning in the early 
1970s was a special one, a commodity inflation caused particularly 
by international forces, including two devaluations of the dollar (to 
which the peso was pegged). Both the Bank of Mexico in its annual 
reports and the office of the Presidency in its annual informe have 
articulated this view. The first step in the analysis below, therefore, 
is to determine, as an empirical matter, the extent to which Mexi-
can inflation can, in fact, be attributable to external events. Or, as 
the case may be, the extent to which domestic events and policies 
are to blame for the acceleration in prices during the 1970s. 
Interestingly enough, at least in the early part of the 1970s, de-
velopments similar to those taking place in Mexico were, to a large 
extent, experienced by a wide number of developing countries. As 
with Mexico, inflation in most of these countries was beginning to 
be significant in 1971-72 and simultaneously becoming rapid in 
1973 (Table Al). Furthermore, almost all countries experienced a 
rate of inflation in 197 3-7 4 that was either close to their historical 
peaks or set new record highs. 
It is this universal and synchronous pattern of worldwide infla-
tion in the 1970s that makes this period unique. Explanations1 of the 
worldwide pattern of price increases range from crop failures and 
the oil shock to excessive monetary supply, generalized wage-push 
and disputes over the division o,f income. Four channels have been 
identified through which inflation may have been transmitted inter-
nationally during this period: (1) external demand, operating 
through the trade account, may have bid up the prices of domestic 
goods (assuming either that there was full employment or that the 
elasticity of supply of exportable goods was low); (2) external price 
movements may have brought the prices of domestic goods in line 
with those of traded goods; (3) excess liquidity may have been 
created by increased external reserves (which encouraged spending 
on goods whose prices rose until the equilibrium level of real 
1. Robert Looney, The Economic Consequences of World Inflation on Semi-
Dependent Countries (Washington: University Press of America, 1979); see also 
Lawrence Krause and Walter Salant, eds., Worldwide Inflation: Theory and Recent 
Experience (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1977); David Meiselman and Arthur 
Laffer, eds., The Phenomenon of Worldwide Inflation (Washington: A_merican En-
terprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 14)75), and Michael Parkin and George 
Zis, eds., Inflation on Open Economies (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1976). 
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balances was restored); and (4) indirect stimuli such as more aggres-
sive international trade union activity, increased social tensions and 
international inflationary expectations may have been increasingly 
active at this time. 
As noted, Mexico's current inflation began in 1973, and in many 
regards this is the most productive period to examine in detail. For 
one thing, causation is much more difficult to establish once infla-
tion has been underway for some time. 
For another, movements in monetary factors2 usually listed as 
major contributory elements in the inflationary process were ex-
periencing particularly wide fluctuations in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, thus making their impact easier to identify through standard 
regression techniques. 
Inflationary Pressures 1973-1974 
One of the most popular explanations of the 1973-74 world-
wide inflation (and Mexico's as well) is the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) price increases. Ironically, 
this is the easiest source of inflationary pressure to dispose of. In 
terms of timing, the OPEC price increases did not take place until 
late in 1973 (November). It is clear, however, that prices around the 
world were increasing well in advance of the OPEC action (some of 
the effects of the higher oil prices are contained in the 1973 infla-
tion rates, of course). 
The worldwide bad weather 9f 1972-73 and subsequent poor 
food harvests were undoubtedly contributory factors to the coun-
try's subsequent inflation, but neither weather nor increased food 
prices can explain the duration of the inflation. The expansion of 
excess liquidity (especially before 1973) would appear more logical 
in this regard. 
In contrast to the pattern of inflation which began to develop 
in 1973, there was a large growth in the money supply in 1972 
(Table 1). Of the twenty-six sample countries whose past inflation 
rates can be regarded as normal, (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and In-
donesia are excluded from the normal group because they have 
2. These channels may be incorporated in the monetary theory of the balance 
of payments. Cf. Harry Johnson, ''The Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments 
Theory," in H. Johnson, Further Essays in Monetary Economics (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 1973); and Michael Parkin, '~A Monetarist Analysis of the Gener-
ation and Transmission of World Inflation: 1958-1971,'' American Economic Review 
(February 1977): 164-171. 
Table Al Rate of Change in the Consumer Price Index, Thirty Developing Countries, 1956-1976 
Percent 
Acceleration 
Annual Average" Peak . Annual Average• in 1972 
Country 1956-60 1961-65 1966-70 1956-70 1971-72 1972 1973 1973-74 1975-76 over 1966-70 
Argentina 41.8 23.2 n.a.b 111.l 46.8 58.5 60.7 42.I 3I3.2 n.a. 
Bolivia 65.8 5.2 6.0 I 1.2 5.1 6.6 31.5 47.8 6.3 0.6 
Brazil 25.6 63.0 n.a. 87.0 I8.3 I6.4 12.7 20.2 35.3 n.a. 
Chile 29.4 28.6 26.8 46.0 49.2 79.I 351.9 428.7 293.2 52.3 
Colombia 9.5 I2.9 10.2 32.2 I 1.7 14.3 22.8 23.6 21.5 4.I 
Domin1can Republic 0.1 2.8 1.3 9.2 6.I 7.9 I5. I I4. I I I. I 6.6 
Ecuador -0.I 3.9 4.7 6.5 8.2 7.9 I3.0 18.I n.a. 3.2 
Egypt 1.4 3.4 4.2 14.9 2.6 2.1 4.3 7.6 10.0 - 2.1 
El Salvador 0.4 0.2 I. I 5.7 1.0 1.5 6.4 11.6 I5. I 0.4 
Ghana 1.7 11.0 4.I 25.4 8.0 13.5 10.2 17.2 46.9 9.4 
Guatemala -0.2 0.1 1.5 2.4 0.1 0.6 13.8 15.1 11.9 -0.9 
India 5.2 6.0 6.9 13.8 4.4 5.8 17.4 22.4 - 1.0 - 1.1 
Indonesia 20.I 83.8 n.a. n.a. 9.1 I2.7 31.5 36.0 19.4 n.a. 
Table 1 Rate of Growth of the Money Supply, Thirty Developing Countries, 1956-76" 
Percent 
Acceleration 
Annual Average Peak Annual Average" in 1972 
Country 1956-60 1961-65 1966-70 1956-70 1971-72 1972 1973-74 1975-76 over 1966-70 
Argentina 53.8 18.6 10.2 23.0 17.2 22.4 39.2 20.6 12.2 
Bolivia 53.8 18.6 10.2 23.0 17.2 22.4 39.2 20.6 12.2 
Brazil 29.1 65.8 n.a. 87.4 32.8 34.6 39.9 37.4 n.a. 
Chile 23.3 37.8 n.a. 104.5 103.8 105.7 296.7 265.2 n.a. 
Colombia n.a.< 18.4 19.8 24.0 15.4 20.6 27.1 21.9 0.8 
Dominican Republic n.a. 4.9 6.8 15.7 11.9 12.6 23.6 9.0 9.8 
Ecuador 6.3 9.9 15.5 25.1 18.0 17.6 38.8 22.2 2.1 
Egypt n.a. 10.4 4.0 20.2 9.4 13.0 24.0 23.4 9.0 
El Salvador 1.5 3.8 3.9 12.4 9.3 11.3 25.1 22.4 7.4 
Ghana 6.2 16.8 4.7 26.1 19.0 38 8 22.8 42.5 34.1 
Guatemala 5.6 6.3 4.5 14.3 10.3 14.6 23.7 23.1 IO.I 
India 6.5 9.0 9.5 11.9 12.7 12.5 15.3 11.4 3.0 
Indone.sia 29.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. 30.0 33.8 41.0 30.5 n.a. 
Iran 17.5 12.1 10.5 26.6 23.7 32.6 26.6 41.5 n.a. 
Iran 6.9 2.0 1.4 11.2 5.3 6.4 9.8 11.9 12.1 5.0 
Iraq 2.1 1.1 3.5 6.5 4.4 5.2 4.9 6.6 9.9 1.7 
Korea, Republic of 11.2 15.2 11.4 27.9 12.1 11.7 3.0 13.4 28.4 -0.2 
Malaysia 0.4 0.5 1.4 4.6 2.4 3.2 10.6 14.0 3.6 2.8 
Mexico 5.9 1.9 3.7 12.2 5.4 5.0 11.4 16.9 16.5 1.3 
Morocco 3.6 4.0 0.6 6.1 3.9 3.7 4.2 10.9 8.2 3.1 
Nigeria 4.1 2.8 5.9 13.9 9.4 2.8 6.0 9.2 27.6 0.1 
Pakistan 4.1 2.0 4.5 11.3 7.2 5.1 23.1 24.9 14.0 0.6 
Peru 8.5 9.0 9.8 19.0 7.0 7.1 9.5 13.2 28.6 -2.7 
Philippines 2.2 4.7 6.1 14.4 12.4 10.2 11.0 22.7 7.1 4.1 
Sri Lanka 0.6 1.7 4.2 7.4 4.5 6.3 9.6 10.9 4.0 2.1 
Sudan 1.0 3.3 3.9 12.6 6.2 10.9 17.9 22.0 12.8 7.0 
Syria 4.3 0.6 3.3 14.7 3.0 1.0 19.8 17.4 15.6 -2.0 
Taiwa~ 11.2 2.4 4.4 n.a. 2.8 2.9 8.2 27.8 3.9 - 1.5 
Thailand 2.4 1.5 2.6 6.2 3.0 3.9 11.7 17.5 4.1 1.3 
Tunisia 2.7 2.7 2.9 13.5 3.9 2.1 4.6 4.4 7.4 -0.8 
Venezuela 2.4 0.4 1.6 5.0 3.1 2.9 4.1 6.2 8.9 1.0 
SOURCE: International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
(a) Single years refer to price rises over the previous year's level, two or more years to an average over those years. 
(b) n.a. = not available. 
.. 
Iraq I7.5 6.I 9.3 44.8 7.0 I 1.8 27.0 31.1 2.5 
Korea, Republic of I8.3 22.9 35.9 45.7 26.6 32.6 38.8 27.0 -3.3 
Malaysia 6.8 4.9 6.2 I5.9 10.7 I4.5 27.2 I 1.8 8.3 
Mexico 10.6 I 1.5 I 1.2 I I. I 10.9 I4.2 21.6 22. I 3.0 
Morocco n.a. 7.3 8.2 23.8 I2.5 16.6 20.I 19.3 8.4 
Nigeria n.a. 9.6 I6. I 51.9 10.7 7.8 30.6 69.8 -8.3 
Pakistan 7.4 7.4 9.2 I6.9 I8.7 20.2 8.9 I7.4 I 1.0 
Peru n.a. I7.3 I9.4 43.7 23.4 22.2 30.I 24.3 2.8 
Philippines n.a. 8.7 11.0 27.5 16.6 18.7 23.0 I5.3 7.7 
Sri Lanka 3.7 6.9 3.7 10.9 6.8 6.9 15.2 I2.9 3.2 
Sudan I 1.5 I 1.8 I3.0 20.5 6.6 7.0 27.9 I8.0 -6.0 
Syria 9.6 
. 
9.4 13.9 19.3 13. l 17.3 35.5 24.I 3.4 
Taiwan I5.2 21.7 I7.7 36.4 24.I 20.4 29.8 I9.9 2.7 
Thailand 6.9 6.2 7.I 12.2 I 1.5 I2.7 17.7 10.5 5.6 
Tunisia n.a. 9.5 2.9 21.2 19.5 21.0 17.S IS. I I8. I 
Venezuela 8.7 7.2 6.6 27.9 16.1 20.7 27.S 37.7 14.1 
SOURCE: International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
(a) Money supply refers to cash and demand deposits. 
(b) Single year refers to price rises over previous year's level, two or more years to an average over those years. 
(c) n.a. =Not available. 
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suffered hyperinflation in the past), eight showed much higher rates 
of growth in the money supply during 1972 than at any other time 
between 1956 and 1970. In addition only one country showed a 
higher rate of inflation between 1956 and 1970 than in 1973.3 
Not only were the 1972 rates of growth in the money supply 
high in most countries (compared with past rates), but the jump 
from historical levels seems to have occurred almost simultaneously. 
The average growth in the money supply for the group of normal 
(non-hyperinflation) countries ranged from 8.6 percent to 12.5 per-
cent during 1961-69. It increased to 14.6 percent in 1970, expand-
ing to 17. 7 percent in 1972. Significantly, the average growth in 
consumer prices did not increase above its 1961-72 range of 2. 3 
percent to 5.8 percent until 1973. 
These patterns were unprecedented. In normal times, the ac-
celeration in the rate of growth of the money supply and prices over 
their historical increases would be expected to be zero. And indeed, 
this was the case in 1972 with the acceleration in prices (over the 
1966-70 average) ranging for the above sample of countries from 
- 0.8 to 0.7. In 1973, however, prices accelerated by 5.9%, increas-
ing to 7.6% in 1974. In contrast, the acceleration of money supply 
during 1968-71 had a range of 3.0 to 2.6 for the sample countries, 
increasing to 6.1 in 1973 and even further to 7.4 in 1974.4 
In sum, there is no question that at least for the 1970-72 period, 
the acceleration in the money supply preceded the acceleration in 
prices. Causation would thus seem to be from money to prices, 
rather than is often hypothesiz~d by Keynesians from prices to 
money. 5 More precisely, increases in the money supply were not the 
result of an accommodating monetary policy, and more impor-
tantly, the acceleration in the money supply in 1972 (and in prices 
in 1973-74) was worldwide. 
As can be seen in the comparative tables, movements in prices 
and money in Mexico closely followed these worldwide patterns. 
If there is any doubt that the initial inflationary pressures were 
monetary, it should be noted that in 1972 and 1973 the deviations 
of real GDP in Mexico did not lie appreciably above the long run 
trend. Neither growth rates nor their deviation from the trend can 
3. Surjit Bhalla, "The Transmission of Inflation into Developing Economies," 
in William Cline, ed., World Inflation and the Developing Countries (Washington: 
The Brookings Institution, 1981), 54. 
4. Ibid., 54. 
5. See N. Kaldor, "Inflation and Recessio~ in the World Economy," The Eco-
nomic journal (December 1976): 703-714, for an exposition of the prices-money 
causal mechanism for this period. 
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explain the extraordinary increase in money supply in 1972. Fur-
thermore, similar periods of expansion have occurred before 
without a corresponding acceleration in consumer prices. 
Domestic Causes of Expansion of the Money Supply 
Little evidence has been found so far that purely domestic causes 
were responsible for the acceleration of money supply in Mexico in 
1970-72. Crop failures and lagging food supply, which have been 
assigned a prominent position in the structuralist list of causes of in-
flation, however, could have played an important role at this time. 
In terms of food production on a per capita basis, Mexico's per-
formance was substandard, declining by 3.6 in 1972 and 1.9 in 1973 
(with 1961-65 = 100 the index of per capita food production was 
110 in 1971). 
Whether this was sufficient to induce an increase in the domes-
tic money supply is much more uncertain. The structuralist's argu-
ment that lagging agricultural supply causes inflation is based on the 
assumption that: (1) food prices are flexible; (2) non-food prices are 
relatively fixed; and (3) that imports are not used extensively to 
maintain a stable price level. 6 If foreign exchange shortages dictate 
a policy of permitting only essential imports, a food shortage can, 
by inducing an increase in the relative price of food, initiate a period 
of inflation; i.e., to avoid a severe decline in output when prices in 
the nonfarm sector are sticky, an increase in the relative price of 
food would most likely have to bt; financed by a:n increase in nomi-
nal money, and thus leading to inflation. 
On the surface this argument seems to have some merit in the 
Mexican case. In terms of the pattern of food prices, Mexico's rela-
tive food prices actually declined from a base of 1970 = 1.00 to 
0.93 in 1972. Thereafter, they rose to 1.09 in 1973 and to 1.47 in 
197 4. A closer examination of quantitative data, however, reveals 
that while food prices began to rise in mid-1973, the money sup-
ply had been increasing at an accelerated pace all through 1972. 
Food shortages may therefore have had a limited role in causing the 
money supply growth of 1972, with at most the food decline ex-
acerbating the acceleration of the money supply. On the other hand, 
the decline in food production and increased prices of food imports 
can not be completely ruled out as having played a significant role 
in the overall 1973-74 price acceleration. Wage increases were not 
6. Susan Wacher, Latin American Inflation (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 
1976), 11-12. 
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excessive (Table A2) and are easily disposed of as a major contribu-
tory factor to the money supply increases. 
Clearly, then, the government budget is the logical place to be-
gin any analysis of the expansion in the money supply. Although 
Mexico's financial markets are relatively developed by Latin Ameri-
can standards, they are not developed to the extent that large scale 
non-inflationary financing of the government deficit is possible 
through the issuance of public bonds. In the final analysis, if the 
government cannot mobilize domestic savings, the budget deficits 
must be financed by creating money. 
Budget deficits as a percentage of gross domestic product in-
creased from 0.81 percent in 1970 to 2.04 percent in 1972, 3.06 in 
1973, and 3.61 in 1974, (Table A3). 
The deficits in turn created a number of dilemmas for the Bank 
of Mexico. 7 In particular, the bank had to decide the source of funds 
to draw upon to finance the government deficit. This process en-
tailed a series of steps. First, the bank had to estimate the amount 
of credit that would be available from foreign sources. After this was 
determined, the levels to be financed with domestic credit were set. 
If the amounts of domestic funds needed were impossible to raise, 
the bank often attempted to attract more foreign savings into the 
Mexican banking system (through increasing the interest differential 
vis-a-vis international financial centers). The interest rate differen-
tial together with the reputation for political and economic stabil-
ity that Mexico had earned in the 1960s acted as an incentive for 
increased amounts of savings. . 
Therefore, besides helping to finance the current account deficit 
of the balance of payments, foreign savings were used to finance the 
government's budget deficits. To facilitate this process, banks were 
obliged to invest their required reserves in government bonds or in 
selected sectors of the economy. In essence, since these legal 
reserves.were imposed on all the funds, the banks received the funds 
for government financing regardless of their origin. 8 
If the total amount of available funds (foreign plus domestic) 
were sufficient to finance the government deficit, the Bank of Mex-
ico would be in a neutral position, neither expanding nor reducing 
its holdings of international reserves. On the other hand, if all of 
7. Gilberto Escobedo, "The Response of the Mexican Economy to Policy Ac-
tions," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review Qune 1973): 19; see also Gilberto 
Escobedo, "Formulating a Model of the Mexi~n Economy," Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis, Review Quly 1973): 8-19, for an excellent summary of the applicabil-
ity of various macroeconomic models to the Mexican economy. 
8. Escobedo, "The Response of the Mexican Economy to Policy Actions," 20. 
Table A2 Mexico: Selected Growth Rates, 1968-1980 
Average Annual Rates of Growth 
Wholesale Consumer implicit Total Foreign 
Prices Prices Deflator GDP Total Currency Urban Real Reserves Assets 
Mexico City Nationwide of GDP 1960 Money and Demand Minimum Manufacturing Minus Bank of 
Year 1954 = 100 1978 = 100 1960 = 100 Prices Supply Coin Deposits Wages Wages Gold Mexico 
1968 2.0 0.8 2.4 8.1 12.9 13.0 12.9 0.0 0.0 17.1 7.1 
1969 2.6 3.4 3.9 6.3 11.6 11.3 11.9 0.0 2.6 0.2 5.0 
1970 6.0 5.3 4.5 6.9 10.5 10.4 10.5 16.3 0.9 15.2 3.5 
1971 3.7 5.3 4.5 3.4 8.3 8.3 8.2 0.0 2.4 32.4 24.5 
1972 2.8 5.0 5.6 7.3 21.2 22.8 20.1 18.3 2.4 29.8 30.6 
1973 15.7 12.0 12.4 7.6 24.2 27.6 21.7 5.2 0.3 18.9 7.0 
1974 ·22.5 23.8 24.0 5.9 22.0 25.1 19.9 35.9 4.0 6.7 1.1 
1975 10.5 15.2 16.7 4.1 21.3 22.4 20.5 16.0 4.8 H.7 10.8 
1976 22.2 15.8 21.7 2.1 30.9 52.8 13.5 29.3 9.0 - 14.1 39.8 
1977 41.2 28.9 32.0 3.3 26.6 11.0 43.3 27.9 2.0 38.8 5.0 
1978 15.8 17.5 18.1 7.3 32.6 29.5 35.2 13.5 - 3.1 11.7 17.0 
1979 18.3 18.2 20.7 8.0 33.1 30.3 35.6 16.8 10.4 33.3 
1980 24.5 26.3 30.0 7.4 33.7 32.0 34.9 17.8 39.3 31.8 
SOURCE: Compiled from data in Banco de Mexico, Informe Anual, various issues; Banco de Mexico, Jndicadores Econ6micos, various issues. 
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Table A3 Public Sector Expenditure, Borrowing" and GDP, 1972-1980 
Billions, current pesos 
Increase Ratio Gross Ratio 
Year GDP Percent Expenditure Percent Borrowing Percent IPIY 
(1) (2) (3) (3)/(1) (4) (4)/(1) (5) 
1972 512.3 13.2 147.3 28.7 37.5 7.3 5.6 
1973 619.6 20.9 204.0 32.9 62.3 10.1 12.4 
1974 813.7 31.3 276.5 34.0 76.5 9.4 24.0 
1975 988.3 21.5 400.7 40.5 137.1 13.9 16.7 
1976 1228.0 24.3 530.2 43.2 157.4 12.8 21.7 
1977 1674.7 36.4 730.6 44.6 250.0 14.9 32.1 
1978 2104.6 25.7 938.6 44.6 317.4 15.1 17.4 
1979 2704.4c 28.5 1124.3 46.1 487.7 18.0 19.5 
1980 3650.9c 35.0 1683.4 46.1 465.8 27.6 25'.3 
SOURCE: Constructed from Banco de Mexico annual reports and budget tables, 
1972-1980. 
(a) The actual total gross borrowing is given, except in 1979, when it is the 
estimated actual, and in 1980, when it is the budgeted. 
(b) IPD is the implicit price deflator of GDP. 
(c) Estimated, as explained in the text. 
these funds were not enough to finance the government deficit, the 
bank would have to consider direct credit to the Treasury, even at 
the risk of overstimulating total demand.9 
If the threat of excess aggregate demand became very serious, 
the Bank of Mexico would have to take compensatory action on pri-
vate credit (so that the nation's overall economic goals would not 
be endangered). In this case, the bank would most likely reduce 
bank credit to allow Mexico's stock of international reserves to re-
main unchanged (thus assuring the goals of maintenance of a stable 
exchange rate together with free convertibility). 
Summing up, one could conclude that government expenditures 
are the main exogenous variable in the short term. The Bank of Mex-
ico authorities were quite clearly in 1972 left in the rather com-
promising situation of either reducing the amount of funds available 
to the private sector or suffering a reduction in foreign exchange 
holdings. 10 
9. Ibid. 
10. For an alternative and quite different interpretation, see E. V. K. Fitzgerald, 
"Capital Accumulation in Mexico," Developme1't and Change Ouly 1980): 391-414. 
Fitzgerald criticizes this orthodox approach. 
Cf. Robert Looney, "Mexico's Fiscal Crisis: A Critique of the Fitzgerald Thesis." 
Paper presented at the Eastern Economic Association Meetings, Philadelphia, Pa. (April 
1981). 
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Quantitatively the Bank of Mexico's reserve money (BMRM) is 
clearly a function of its largest component, commercial bank 
reserves (CBR), although these reserves by themselves only account 
for about 75 percent of the variation in BMRM (Table A4). Clearly, 
the government deficit (GDEF) is a significant variable (equation 5, 
Table A4). On the other hand, reserve assets of the bank (BMFA) 
were related to nominal exports (EXPTNA) and imports (Z). For rea-
sons outlined below in the discussion of the reserve flow mechan-
ism, real income proved significant in each regression in which it 
was introduced. 
Bank of Mexico credit to the government (BMGC) was found to 
be explained almost completely by government expenditures 
(GENAN): 
BMGC = 2.03 GENAN -12115 
(7.14) (-4.23) 
r2 = 0.982; F = 960.47; 
DW = 1.99 
One implication of this linkage is the inherent tendency toward 
fiscal disequilibrium that began building up in the late 1960s. 11 Price 
stabilization and development objectives were to a certain degree 
becoming increasingly incompatible, especially during times when 
one goal was pursued more vigorously than the other. Given the 
policy framework at the time, the development goal required that 
output grow at the highest annual rate possible. Government expen-
ditures were, therefore, promoted to the extent possible on the as-
sumption that increased total demand would, through increasing 
private profitability, further induce private sector investment. Un-
der Keynesian conditions of general unemployment, demand stimu-
lations ~ight have been expected to result in increased real output 
at relatively constant prices. Given the structural nature of much of 
Mexico's unemployment, however, price stability and high rates of 
growth became conflicting goals. 12 The bank was thus placed in the 
position whereby, in order to finance the increased level of govern-
ment expenditures, it had to either create new money or reduce the 
amount of credit available to the private sector. Clearly, whenever 
new money was created in excess of the prevailing trend, additional 
pressure was exerted on prices.13 
11. For a detailed analysis of this period, see Robert Looney, Mexico's Econ-
omy: A Policy Analysis with Forecasts to 1990 (B~ulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1978), Chapter 5. 
12. The classic statement of this problem is given in A. Navarette, "El Sector 
Publico en el Desarrollo Econ6mico," Investigaci6n Econ6mica (1957), 43-61. 
13. L. Solis, Economic Policy Reform in Mexico (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon 
Press, 1981), 19-24. 
Table A4 Mexico: Estimated Structural Equations-Bank of Mexico Block 
1951-1979 
Bank of Mexico Reserve Money (BMRM) 
(1) BMRM = 2.31 CBRL- 0.39 BMGC - 1.76 E + 1.06 GENAN + 18.84 r 2 = 0.989; F = 509.54 
(16.64) ( - I.63) ( - 4.57) (6.95) (2.86) 
(2) BMRM = 3.24 CBR- 571.98 DUMEX + 577.39 DUMDV + 1.80 DUMTDV + 0.36 r 2 = 0.945; F = 98.29 
(12.47) ( - 7 .75) (8.14) (0.078) (0.016) 
(3) BMRM = 1.97 CBRL+ 3.54 !::, EX - 0.76 EX - 1.11 GDEFL + 129.54 r 2 = 0.976; F = 278.94 
(12.23) (1.24) ( - 4.23) ( - 3.89) (4.55) 
(4) BMRM = 2.28 CBRL - 0. 76 BMGC + 1.49 CPI+ 0.29 INFD - 49. 79 r 2 = 0.968; F = 205.68 
(9. 79) ( - 2.45) (2.67) (0.28) ( - 1.95) 
(5) BMRM = 1.44 CBR- 3.34 GDEF- 2.23 BMGC-· 20.72 r 2 = 0.873; F = 54.81 
(2.63) ( - 3.80) ( - 2.62) ( - 1.60) 
(6) BMlilM = 0.64 BMGC - 1.28 CBR + 2.64 CBRL+ 8.81 r 2 = 0.993; F = 1042.12 
(7 .08) ( - 9.55) (24.87) (3.53) 
Reserve Assets (BMFA) 
(7) BMFA=0.20 EXPTNA+0.0056 GDPNP+ 0.21 r 2 =0.994; F= 1975.56 
(37.61) (4.48) (0.33) 
(8) BMFA=0.22 EXPTNA+0.12 Z+0.015 GDPNP+ I.66 r 2 =0.994; F= 1567.05 
(5.70) (2.96) (5.43) (4.89) 
(9) BMFA=0.16EXPTNA-ll.11DUMEX+l.60EX+5.15DUMDV-3.75DUMTDV- 12.91 r 2 = 0.992;F=678.99 
(9.12) (-2.50) (2.93) (7.97) (-1.61) (-2.72) 
(10) BMFA=0.21 EXPTNA+ 2.56 r 2 =0.989; F=2265.76 
(47.60) (6.01) 
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International Causes of Expansion of the Money Supply 
External factors were perhaps nearly as responsible during this 
period for the monetary acceleration as the government deficits. Ex-
ternal reserves increased at an unusually high rate in both 1971 and 
1972 (and as shown below these increases were systematically 
related to money supply changes). 
During 1966-70, the country maintained a ratio of reserves to 
imports of around 0.32. In 1970 the ratio was still 0.32, but in-
creased to 0.40 and 0.41in1971and1972, respectively. Since the 
government attempted to maintain reserves in a relatively fixed re-
lation to imports, the 1971 and 1972 deviations from the 1960s 
average is indicative of the extent to which the country suddenly ac-
quired excess reserves. 
Another indicator of the degree to which the 1971-72 reserve 
accumulation was excessive is the increase in reserves in 1971 and 
1972 compared with the long run degree of fluctuation (both posi-
tive and negative) in the country's reserves. For the base period 
1965-69, typical reserve fluctuations were calculated as the average 
absolute value of the annual percentage reserve change. By this 
measure the country had a 0.0 average annual rate of change. In 
1970, however, reserves increased by 12.4, and 22.3 in 1972, but 
down to 3.0 in 1974. 
These measures strongly support the conclusion that there was 
an unusual increase in the country's international liquidity in 1971-
72. In order to identify the chann~ls of transmission of external in-
flation, however, it is necessary to determine whether the increase 
was due to changes in the trade balance (which primarily would 
reflect commodity prices and movements in real activity) or to cap-
ital flows (which are the result of monetary factors). 
Both the level and the change of the trade balance are relevant 
for the analysis of the changes in reserves. Because the country had 
negative trade balances and thus used borrowing to cover trade 
deficits, an unanticipated improvement in the trade balance might 
have led to an increase in reserves (if capital flows including borrow-
ing were kept at planned levels). Both the size of the trade deficit 
and the change over the previous year, however, do not suggest a 
partial role for trade in expanding reserve changes since the coun-
try's trade balance deteriorated from $888 million in 1970 to $893 
in 1972, $1,515 million in 1973 to $2,792 million in 1974. 
It appears, therefore, that a greatu part of the expansion of 
reserve changes in the early 1970s lies in the behavior of the capi-
tal markets rather than with the trade balance. Moreover. it is likelv 
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that the reserve growth caused the money supply growth. Again, be-
cause the country lacked developed financial institutions (to the ex-
tent that open market operations could be conducted on a large 
scale), reserve changes were likely to have a direct and immediate 
effect on the domestic liquidity; i.e., ~ince capital inflows and 
reserve increases generally are not sterilized in Mexico, 14 their ex-
pansion thus results in a corresponding increase in the domestic 
money supply. 
Changes in the country's money supply and reserves during the 
period of fixed exchange rates 1956-72 indicates that the money 
multiplier associated with a change in reserves was 1.6; i.e., 
GMl = 3.72 + 1.61 GR 
(3.6) r 2 = 0.712 
where GMl = annual growth in Ml money; GR = annual growth 
in reserves. 
These results suggest the importance of reserve changes in in-
fluencing movements in the money supply. More elaborate estimates 
of the money supply (Table A5) function show it to be very stable, 
as either a function of the reserves of the commercial banks (CBR) 
with the Bank of Mexico, or as a lagged function of Bank of Mex-
ico reserve money (BMRM, BMRML, BMRML2). 
Combined with the information on reserve growth, these results 
suggest that the Bank of Mexico's monetary policies were influenced 
to a considerable degree by external events and in particular by 
changes in the level of reserve assets. The precise role of steriliza-
tion policies cannot, however, be determined directly from the es-
timated equations since monetary expansion might have occurred 
in the absence of reserve changes. The result above does indicate, 
however, that changes in domestic money supply were strongly cor-
related with changes in reserves during this period. Considering the 
unusual expansion of reserves in the country in 1971and1972 that 
connection implies that the acceleration of money supply in 1972 
and 1973 was strongly influenced by international as well as domes-
tic factors. 
One index that might be used to determine the external or im-
ported contribution to money supply growth is the ratio of reserve 
changes to the previous year's money stock. Trends in this ratio 
should be indicative of the relative importance of external and in-
ternal factors responsible for money expansion. 
As a basis of comparison, the ratio was 1.1 in 1966 rising to 2.1 
• 
14. B. Griffiths, Mexican Monetary Policy and Economic Development (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 78-79. 
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in 1970, and up to 4.6 in 1972, falling to 3.5 in 1973 and 1.7 in 
1975. Therefore, 1972 represents the greatest external contribution 
to the growth in the money supply. 
The Role of Public Policy 
Many of the patterns noted above were reinforced by a series of 
ill-timed government policies. 16 
1) In 1970 the current account deficit of the balance of pay-
ments turned out to be almost twice as great as in the previous year. 
To reduce the current account deficit, a drastic cut in government 
spending was budgeted for 1971. Actual spending, however, was 
even lower than budgeted so the end result was that the govern-
ment's deficit as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
was reduced from 1.5 in 1970 to 1.05 in 1971. 
2) Considerable banking system resources, only partially uti-
lized by the private sector, were freed by the sharp decline in 
government expenditures. Although the increase in the financial sec-
tor's real credit extended was at normal levels, financial institutions 
accumulated 2.7 billion pesos in excess reserves. The result was the 
severe economic slump in 1971 with real output growing at only 3.4 
percent. 
3) When the slippage of the growth rate became known and the 
existence of bank's excess reserves was disclosed, the government 
attempted to restore the traditional growth rate through increased 
expenditures. The budget deficit as a proportion of GDP more than 
trebled from 1971 to 1972. 
4) Not only was public spending stepped up, but private invest-
ment increased substantially as well. Reserve requirements for banks 
andfinancieras were lowered in May 1972 when the recovery of 
output was in full swing. 
5) Monetary ease came three months after the rate of change in 
industrial production had already increased above its long run 
growth trend. 
6) Excess reserves were quickly exhausted and the Bank of Mex-
ico, under the stress of a low rate of economic growth, abandoned 
its long run tradition of yearly changes of monetary targets (in line 
with long run trends) and attempted fine tuning by expanding 
domestic credit. 
15. Summarized from Guillermo Ortiz and Leopoldo Solis, "Financial Structure 
and Exchange Rate Experience," journal of Development Economics (1979): 
515-548. 
Table A5 Mexico: Estimated Structural Equations-Money Supply Block 
1951-1979 
Narrow Money Supply (Ml) 
(1) Ml =0.17 CBR+0.12 GDPN + 17.57 DUMDU-14.22 DUMEX- 0.26 
(5.45) (43.09) (2.92) ( - 2.77) ( - 0.34) 
(2) Ml =0.18 CBR+0.12 GDPN + 13.62 DUMDU-11.55 DUMEX-0.68 EXL+ 7.39 
(5.81) (39.34) (2.19) ( - 2.23) ( - I.69) (I.61) 
(3) Ml= 1.35 CBR-96.52 DUMEX+ 177.43 DUMDU + 26.65 
(8.60) ( - 2.24) (4.15) (6.48) 
(4) Ml= 0.90 CBR- 83.86 DUMEX + 125.03 DUMDU + 17 .92 MI - 4.29 MID - 108.66. 
(11.93) ( - 3.92) (6.66) no.86) ( - 3.48) ( - 6.68) 
(5) Ml =0.28 CBR+ 31.47 DUMDU-17.38 DUMEX+4.23 MI+0.93 MIL- 32.77 
(4.25) (2.60) ( - 1.52) (3.23) (12.66) ( - 3.24) 
(6) Ml =0.67 AMRM+ 27.53 
(10.46) (3.11) 
(7) Ml =0.49 BMRM+0.38 BMRL+ 22.56 
(5.52) (2.79) (2.80) 
(8) Ml= 0.38 BMRM + 0.38 BMRML + 0.88 BMRML2 + 2.48 
(9.13) (6.24) (9.76) (0.60) 
(9) Ml= 0.35 BMRM + 0.33 BMRML + 0.69 BMRML2 + 37.09 DUMEX 7.15 
(8.50) (5.15) (5.18) (I.96) (1.55) 
(10) Ml= 0.28 BMRM + 0.35 BMRML + 0.68 BMRML2 + 69.50 DUMEX- 78.93 DUMDU + 8.61 
(13.44) (11.50) (10.68) (7.07) ( - 8.63) (3.88) 
'::I ~· 
r 2 = 0.999; F = 12891.7 
r 2 = 0.999; F = 11187.3 
r 2 = 0.992; F = 703.87 
r 2 =0.994; F=849.15 
r 2 = 0.999; F = 4671.22 
r 2 = 0.814; .F = 109.49 
r 2 = 0.859; F = 73.43 
r 2 = 0.969; F = 272.83 
r 2 = 0.977; F = 230.78 
r 2 = 0.995; F = 816.6 
(11) Ml= 0.26 BMRM + 0.34 BMRML + 0.67 BMRML2 + 93.13 DUMEX- 86.75 DUMDU - 3.97 MID+ 29.73 r 2 = 0.997; F = 1237.12 
(15.54) (14.44) (14.09) 10.15) (-12.33) (-4.25) (5.68) 
(12) Ml= 0.029 BMRM + 0.26 GDPN + 0.049 !::::. GDPN - 1.56 r 2 = 0.999; F = 7364.45 
(2.35) (16.05) (1.86) ( - 1.20) 
(13) Ml= 0.075 CBR+ 0.028 CBRL+ 0.13 GDPN - 1.05 r 2 =0.998; F = 4971.8 
(3.57) (2.03) (13.97) ( - 1.37) 
Supply of Broad Money (M2) 
(14) M2 = 1.24 BMRM + 0.75 BMRML + 16.58 r 2 = 0.842; F = 64.05 
(5.54) (2.17) (0.81) 
(15) M2 = 1.03 BMRM +0.76 BMRML + 1.69 BMRML2 - 21.88 r 2 =0.914; F=81.84 
(5.89) (2.91) (4.40) ( - 1.23) 
(16) M2 = 0.53 BMRM + 0.45 BMRML + 0.24 BMRML2- 334.97 DUMDU + 395.18 DUMEX- r 2 = 0.999; F = 3618.31 
(1942) (8.49) (1.51) (-25.02) (30.22) 
6.17 MID.f5.58 Ml+ 1.41 
(- 5.07) (1.33) (0.041) 
(17) M2 =0.55 BMRM+0.51 BMRML+0.43 BMRML2- 347.97 DUMDU +402.29 DUMEX- r 2 = 0.999; F = 4064.67 
(24.93) (16.49) (6.79) (- 37.34) (33.09) 
6.09 MID+ 45.44 
( - 4.92) (0.55) 
(18) M2 = 1.47 CBR + 0.14 CBRL+ 0.13 GDPN - 0.24 r 2 = 0.998; F = 4882.2 
(17.67) (1.57) (14.34) ( - 0.076) 
NOTE: See Appendix A for definition of symbols. 
Ordinary least squares estimates; TSP estimation program. 
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7) As noted above prices reacted with a lag. It was not until the 
second semester of 1972 when the wholesale price index started ris-
ing gradually. In January of 1973 the annual rate of change of this 
index was already 7. 3 percent; by December of that year it had in-
creased to 25.5 percent. 
8) At the end of May 1973 much too late, and in the face of ac-
celerating inflation, the Bank of Mexico reversed its policy of mone-
tary ease by raising reserve requirements for financieras and banks. 
Interest rates were also increased later that year. By that time, 
however, these measures were largely symbolic. 
9) The government's deficit as a proportion of GDP increased 
by 35 percent in 1973 and the money supply grew at a rate of 24.1 
percent. The rate of inflation turned out to be 15. 7 percent for that 
year and for the first time since the 1950s real interest rates on finan-
cial savings became negative. This trend continued until 1976. 
From the analysis in the sections above, it appears that there is 
adequate evidence to warrant a more detailed examination of the 
monetarist explanation of the country's inflationary process during 
this period. 
A Monetarist Model of Inflation 
The monetarist approach is a logical one to use in examining 
Mexico's price movements since many of the conditions in the coun-
try are consistent with its underlying assumptions: (1) although the 
economy is large by most standai:ds, it is still relatively small in the 
sense that the prices of such important items as capital goods are 
largely determined in world markets, and (2) even though Mexico 
is considered a less developed country, it does have a relatively ad-
vanced financial sector, headed by a central bank which, over most 
of the period in question, was responsible for influencing the exter-
nal balance (the balance of payments) as well as domestic credit 
conditions. 
Thus Mexico provides not only the conditions necessary for 
testing a monetary model, 16 but also some interesting insights into 
the model's policy implications, especially with regard to the nature 
and causes <>f inflation experienced by the country. 
16. In particular see the analysis of D. Sykes Wilford in Monetary Policy and 
the Open Economy: Mexico's Experience (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), Chap-
ter 3; Bluford Putnam and D. Sykes Wilford, TIJe Monetary Approach to Interna-
tional Adjustment (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978); and D. Sykes Wilford and 
]. Richard Zecher, "Monetary Policy and the Balance of Payments in Mexico, 1955-
1975," journal of Money, Credit, and Banking (August 1979): 340-348. 
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The monetary approach to inflation in Mexico developed here 
is similar to the monetarist approach developed by Wilford to ex-
plain movements in the country's balance of payments; i.e., it starts 
with the fundamental proposition that inflation is merely an inter-
action of market supply and demand for money. Put differently, 
price movements are viewed by this model as systematically depen-
dent upon current and immediate past evolutions of the interaction 
between supply and demand conditions, and with movements 
(Table A6) in the U.S. or world rate of inflation.17 
The starting point of this analysis is the basic monetarist model 
derived from the equation of exchange. 18 More specifically, assume 
a simple money demand function of the following form: 
(1) M/PY = Y°C6 
where M is the (exogenously determined) nominal stock of money, 
Pis the price, Y is a measure of real income, and C is the expected 
cost of holding real balances. Equation (1) is solved for P and ex-
pressed in terms of growth rates (or depicted by G prefixing the 
variable): 
(2) INF= RM - (1-a) GY - bGC 
Equation (2) incorporates the basic elements of the monetarist 
approach to inflation: money, real income, and the expected cost 
of holding real balances. In addition this formulation captures the 
basic methodological bias of the monetarist school; i.e., the equa-
tion has a limited number of variables, and the nature of relation-
ships is clear and straightforward. The growth of money relative to 
output and cost of holding real balances will generate an increase in 
the rate of inflation. The growth of real income will cause decreases 
in the rate of inflation (via absorbing money in the increased de-
mand for real balances). Similarly, the rate of inflation is assumed 
to be inversely related to the expected cost of holding real balances. 
Equation (2) assumes instantaneous adjustment of monetary 
changes and no money illusion. Therefore, the tested form of the 
monetarist equation is: 
17. As formed here and by D. Sykes Wilford, "Price Levels, Interest Rates, Open 
Economies and a Fixed Exchange: The Mexican Case 1954-1974," Review of Busi-
ness and Economic Research (Spring 1977): 52-65. See, however, Francis W. Ahk-
ing, "Mexico: The Open Economy-A Note," Review of Business and Economic 
Research (1980), 103-107, for a discussion of the statistical limitations in drawing 
conclusions as to the validity of the unified goods market for Mexico and the U.S. 
18. The formulation used follows that of Harberger. Cf. Arnold Harberger, "The 
Dynamics of Inflation in Chile," In C. Christ, ed. ,.Measurement in Economics (Stan-
ford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963), and R. Vogel, "The Dynamics of Infla-
tion in Latin America, 1950-1969," American Economic Review (March 1974): 
102-114. 
Table A6 Changes in Money and Real Wages in Mexico and the United States, 1968-1980 
1968 = 100 
Mexican Average Urban Minimum Wage Average Real Manufacturing Wages 
Money Wage Real Wagei Mexico United States2 
Annual% Annual% Annual% Annual% 
Index Change Index Change Index Change Index Change 
1968 100 - 100 - 100 - 100 
1969 . 100 0.0 96.6 - 3.4 102.6 2.6 103.2 3.2 
1970 116.3 16.3 107.0 10.8 103.5 0.9 103.8 0.7 
1971 116.3 0.0 101.5 - 5.1 106.0 2.4 106.5 2.6 
1972 137.6 18.3 114.4 12.7 108.5 2.4 109.7 3.0 
1973 144.7 5.2 107.3 -6.2 108.8 0.3 109.7 0.0 
1974 196.7 35.9 117.9 9.9 113.2 4.0 106.7 -2.7 
1975 228.2 16.0 119.Q 0.9 118.6 4.8 105.9 -0.7 
1976 295.0 29.3 132.8 11.6 129.3 9.0 107.3 1.3 
1977 337.3 27.9 131.6 -0.9 131.9 2.0 108.4 1.0 
1978 428.1 13.5 127.1 -3.4 127 .8 -3.1 109.0 0.6 
1979 500.0 16.8 125.6 -1.2 - 105.6 -3.1 
19803 589.0 17.8 141.1 12.3 - 102.5 -5.5 
Oanuary) 
SOURCE: Bank of Mexico, Precios, Cuaderno Mensual, Febrero 1980, constructed from Tables 7 to 11; and US data 
from Economic Indicators, February 1980, Washington, D.C. 
( 1) Index of money wage increases corrected for inflation by dividing by the national consumer price in-
dex for each country. 
(2) Index of hourly earnings in private non-agricultural industries (constructed from US Economic Indica-
tors, February 1980). For statistical convenience, I took this measure of wage increases rather than 
manufacturing wages. From 1970 to January 1980, manufacturing gross hourly earnings in current dollars 
were at a higher level than total non-agricultural, and in those ten years, manufacturing rose by 4.3% 
more than total non-agricultural. 
(3) For Mexico, the January figure is the annual increase for 1980, which will be eroded by inflation as the 
year goes by. For the United States, it is the percentage change from January 1979. 
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INFW = a + alGM + a2GML + GML2 - GGDPNP + INFWE 
where GGDPNP is the growth of real gross domestic product; GML 
is the growth of the money supply (either Ml or M2) lagged one 
year; GML2 is the growth in the money supply lagged two years, and 
INFWE is some measure of inflationary expectations (using the 
wholesale price index). Here INFWE is this rate of inflation minus 
last year's rate. 19 
The basic monetarist contention is: (1) that the causal relation 
runs from money to prices and output; (2) any persistent increase 
in money relative to output is a sufficient condition for inflation; (3) 
the magnitude and length of inflation is dependent on the magnitude 
and persistence of monetary growth; (4) the occurrence of inflation 
is independent of the level of employment in the economy, and (5) 
it is the increasing growth rate of money which yields inflationary 
pressures. 
The results20 of the monetary regressions on the rate of increase 
in the wholesale price index indicate that the monetarist model per-
forms extremely well. Both the growth in Ml and M2 were used, 
with Ml performing slightly better. 
GMl is highly significant explaining nearly 73 percent of the ob-
served rate of inflation (equation 1, Table 2). Similar results 
(Table 3) were obtained for the rate of increase in the gap deflator 
(INF) and the rate of increase in the currency price index (INFC). 
When combined with other variables in the wholesale equations, 
GMl is still significant, rising to over 89 percent explanation of the 
variance in INFW when combined with GM2L, expected inflation 
INFWE, and the U.S. inflation (USINFC), the ratio of imports to GDP 
(ZA), and the growth in real GDP (GGDPNP). In general the growth 
of U.S. prices gives somewhat better results than world inflation 
lagged one year. 
The positive sign on the inflationary expectations term (INFWE, 
INFCE) as proxied by this year's rate of price increase minus last 
year's is of interest and has certain implications for monetary policy. 
The positive sign (equations 6, 7, 8 of Table 3; equations 3, 4, 5, 7, 
8 of Table 2) indicates that with increased inflation, individuals may 
19. In the original, Harberger formulation inflationary expectations were ap-
proximated by the rate of inflation last year minus the rate two years prior. The for-
mulation used here gave slightly better results. 
20. The equations were also estimated using the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative 
technique to correct for serial correlation of the error terms. While some serial corre-
lation was found, the results obtained were essentially the same as those presented. 
Estimations were made using Time Series Processor version 3.5C. See Bronwyn Hall 
and Robert E. Hall, Time Series Processor (Stanford Calif: Hall and Hall, 1980) for the 
documentation on this procedure. 
Table 2 Mexico: Monetary Determinants of Inflation 
1951--1980 
Independent Variables Dependent 
Variable Equation GMI GMIL INFWE US/NFC GM2 GM2L ZA GGDPNP RHO Intercept r F 
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(2.6S) (3.6S) (6.06) 
0.49 0.61 0.4S 




















0.34 O.S8 0.33 
. (3.77) (I0.6S) (2.7~) 
-0.03 -5.98 
. (-0.17) ( - 3.2S) 0.72S 6S.91 
0.04 -7.28 
(0.22) ( - 3.70) 0.744 34.9S 
0.40 -S.99 
(2.24) (- 2.93) 0.813 30.S6 
0.17 - S.41 
(2.89) ( - 2.4S) 0.822 23.09 
16.47 
( - 3.98) 0.891 2S.88 
0.26 -3.17 
(1.39) ( - 2.00) 0.762 38.43 
-3.S6 
( - 3.62) 0.899 46.78 
-3.08 
( - 2.83) 0.846 47.03 
•.· "~'"' 
Table 3 Mexico: Estimated Structural Equations-Inflation Block 
1951-1979 
Inflation-Gross Domestic Product Deflator Measure (INF) 
(1) INF= 0.66 GMl + 0.46 GMIL - 8.83 
(2.87) (2.48) ( - 4.30) 
(2) INF= 0.84 GMl - 0.636 GDPNP - 0.51 
(7.10) ( - 3.44) ( - 0.20) 
(3) INF= 0.616 Ml+ 0.286 Mll + 0.34 GM112 - 9.99 
(3.75) (1.43) (2.01) ( - 4.97) 
(4) INF=0.57 GMI +0.45 GMIL-0.62 GGDPNP- 2.58 
(4.16) (3.12) ( - 4.00) ( - 1.15) 
(5) INF= 0.51 GMl + 0.32 GMIL + 0.28 WINF- O.S6 GGDPNP - 1.84 
(4.07) (2.23) (2.32) (3.88) ( - 0.89) 
(6) INF-=0.54 GMl +0.47 GMIL-0.77 GGDPNP+0.03 INFE- I.63 
(4.18) (3.42) ( -4.53) (I.99) ( -0.74) 
Inflation-Consumer Price Index Measure (/NFC) 
(7)INFC=0.30 GM2 +0.24 GM2L+0.31 INFCE+0.38 WINF-59.71 ZB- 8.36 
(2.83) (2.08) (2.32) (2.66) ( - I.66) ( - 1.96) 
(8) INFC = 0.276 M2 + 0.29 GM2L + 0.34 WINF + 0.35 INFCE - I.64 
(2.53) (2.53) (2.30) (2.54) (- 1.14) 
r,,_-, ~ ', ,. 
''\:'-;\ 
r'=0.733; F=31.56; 
r2 = 0.776; F = 39.95; 
r2 =0.774; F=25.17; 
r2 = 0.845; F = 40.08; 
r2 =0.877; F=37.38; 
r2 = 0.866; F = 33.89; 
r2 = 0.828; F = 19.29; 
r 2 = 0.804; F = 21.61; 
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have actually increased their holdings of money, an apparently ir-
rational move since inflation was eroding the value of these hold-
ings at the time. This, however, can to some extent be explained by 
the financial structure of the country, which can be characterized 
by:21 
1) greater reliance of firms on internal financing than on the is-
suance of new securities; 2) only limited activity in the domestic 
stock exchange with new securites being mainly purchased by the 
financial institutions rather than the non-bank private sector, and 
3) deposits with the monetary system constituting the major por-
tion of the public's claims on the financial intermediaries. Given the 
relative lack of alternative assets and financial instruments, increased 
money holdings during periods of inflation is not as irrational as it 
might at first appear. 
Conclusions 
Based on the Mexican experience with inflation in the 1970s, it 
is clear that any meaningful framework for the analysis of Mexican 
inflation in the 1980s must systematically take into account the role 
of money in the economy. It should not be inferred from this anal-
ysis, however, that inflation in the 1980s is necessarily the result of 
an identical set of forces or mechanisms present in the 1970s. 
On the other hand, it is apparent that the tendency of Mexican 
presidents to minimize the role of money or government actions in 
affecting price change created ,an environment in the early 1980s 
conducive to monetary expansion. For example, President Lopez 
Portillo argued in his 1979 Informe that: 1) Mexico's inflation was 
due largely to the time consuming process of production, "the 
natural lack of synchronization with the consequent waiting period 
between investment and output of the final product;'' 2) oil subsi-
dies to consumers were viewed as reducing private expenditure thus 
moderating inflation; and 3) a considerable part of the inflation was 
attributed to the rising prices of imports. 22 
In his 1979 Informe the President further noted that there was 
no certain cure for inflation "for the world has been struggling to 
eradicate it for six years." He also declared that Mexico was doing 
its best to control domestic inflation, but since it was suffering from 
21. Francis Lees and Maximo Eng, International Financial Markets: Develop-
ment of the Present System and Future Pro!ilJects (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1975), Chapter 18. 
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many shortages, "it would be unfair to fight inflation by prevent-
ing these from being converted into demand .... " The remedy was 
to improve supply ''by increasing the flow of basic consumer 
goods," and if this could not be done through the "existing struc-




























Definition of Symbols 
Bank of Mexico Reserve Money 
Bank of Mexico Credit to Government 
Nominal Exports (National Income Accounts) 
Government Expenditures (Consumption & Investment, 
National Income Accounts) 
Dummey Variable; 0,1951-75 
1,1976-80 
Dummey Variable; 0,1951-75 
0,1977-80 
1,1976 
Dummey Variable; 0,1951-53 
1,1954-75 
2,1976-80 
= Commercial Bank Reserves 
Peso-dollar exchange· rate 
Government deficit (Government revenue minus 
government expenditure) 
Consumer price index 
Mexican-United States inflation rate 
Minimal Gross Domestic Product 
Mexican short term interest rate 
Growth normal GDP 
Mexican inflation 
Net foreign assets of Bank of Mexico 
Domestic assets of Bank of Mexico 
Average annual growth in net foreign assets 
Average annual growth in Bank of Mexico domestic 
credit 
Average annual growth in Mexican short term interest 







L, at end 
of symbol 
L2 at end 
of symbol 
Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 
Rate in current year minus inflation previous year 
(wholesale prices) 
United States gross domestic product 
Rate of inflation (wholesale prices) 
GDP deflator 
Change (current year value minus previous year value) 
Value lagged one year 
Value lagged two years 
• 
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